Frequency vs. Probability Formats: Framing the Three Doors Problem by Aaron, Eric & Spivey-Knowlton, Michael
Frequency vs. Probability Formats: Framing the Three Doors Problem
Eric Aaron (aaron@cs.cornell.edu)
Department of Computer Science; Cornell University
Ithaca, NY  14853
Michael Spivey-Knowlton (spivey-knowlton@cornell.edu)
Department of Psychology; Cornell University
Ithaca, NY  14853
Abstract
Instead of subscribing to the view that people are unable
to perform Bayesian probabilistic inference, recent re-
search suggests that the algorithms people naturally use
to perform Bayesian inference are better adapted for in-
formation presented in a natural frequency format than in
the common probability format.  We tested this hypothe-
sis on the notoriously difficult three doors problem, in-
ducing subjects to consider the likelihoods involved in
terms of natural frequencies or in terms of probabilities.
We then examined their ability to perform the mathe-
matics underlying the problem, a stronger indication of
Bayesian inferential performance than merely whether
they gave the correct answer to the problem.  With a ro-
bustness that may surprise people unfamiliar with the ef-
fects of information formats, the natural frequency group
demonstrated dramatically greater normative mathemati-
cal performance than the probability group.  This sup-
ports the importance of information formats in a more
complex context than in previous studies.
Introduction
Undeniably, reasoning with probabilities can be difficult for
people.  This is not because such reasoning is unstudied or
impossible; there is a well-established mathematics of cor-
rect probabilistic reasoning, and we use the term Bayesian
inference (named after Thomas Bayes (1702(?)-1761)) to
refer to a normative inference that agrees with this frame-
work.  Nonetheless, cognitive science is rich with demon-
strations of people’s failures to reason according to Bayesian
norms when presented with many kinds of non-trivial prob-
abilistic reasoning problems.  In an influential summation,
Kahneman & Tversky (1972) take a pessimistic stance, go-
ing so far as to conclude that "In his evaluation of evidence,
man is apparently not a conservative Bayesian: he is not a
Bayesian at all."
Recently, however, Gigerenzer (in press; Gigerenzer &
Hoffrage, 1995; Hoffrage & Gigerenzer. 1996) has sug-
gested an explanation for human performance on these tasks
without claiming that people lack the ability to function as
Bayesian agents.  People do have methods or algorithms for
reasoning about probabilities, but as humans evolved over
the ages, the algorithms for Bayesian reasoning were not
exposed to information expressed as probabilities.  Instead,
people gathered information as it came to them, one event at
a time and not with the collective information about a set of
events that probabilities would give.  Thus, Gigerenzer sug-
gests in his framework of Ecological Intelligence that peo-
ple's Bayesian algorithms are adapted for natural frequen-
cies (e.g., “out of 160 coin tosses, 80 landed heads”) as op-
posed to the probabilities (e.g., “50% of the coin tosses
landed heads”) in which information is traditionally pre-
sented in studies that produce anti-normative evidence.  This
difference between information formats may not seem dra-
matic, but in some contexts it can have important effects.
An example taken from Gigerenzer (in press) demon-
strates the power of presenting information in a natural fre-
quency format as opposed to a probability format.  Consider
a physician who just discovered that a symptom-free woman
between 40 and 50 years old has had a positive mammogram
in a routine breast cancer screening.  He needs to advise his
patient about the bad news and what to do next, and a first
step is estimating the likelihood of the patient actually hav-
ing breast cancer.  Fortunately, he knows all the relevant
information (presented here as in Gigerenzer (in press)):
The probability that a woman has breast cancer is 1% if
she is in the same risk group as this patient.
If a woman has breast cancer, the probability is 80% that
she will have a positive mammogram.
If a woman does not have breast cancer, the probability is
10% that she will still have a positive mammogram.
He can then ask himself:
Imagine a woman (aged 40 to 50, no symptoms) who has
a positive mammogram in your breast cancer screening.
What is the probability that she actually has breast can-
cer? _____%
Unfortunately, a study of 24 physicians done by Gigerenzer
& Hoffrage (Gigerenzer, in press; Hoffrage & Gigerenzer,
1996) showed that, under these conditions, physicians fre-
quently mis-estimate the probability of a patient having can-
cer by nearly a full order of magnitude.  The median esti-
mate of actual breast cancer after a positive mammogram
was 70%.  However, the correct Bayesian estimate is 7.7%,
and only 2 out of the 24 physicians (8%) gave that response.
In the same study, 24 other physicians were given the
same estimation task, but they were given the information in
a frequency format, as shown here:
Ten out of every 1,000 women have breast cancer.
Of these 10 women with breast cancer, 8 will have a posi-
tive mammogram.
Of the remaining 990 women without breast cancer, 99
will still have a positive mammogram.
Imagine a sample of women (aged 40 to 50, no symptoms)
who have positive mammograms in your breast cancer
screening.  How many of these women do actually have
breast cancer?  _____ out of _____
With this frequency format presentation, 11 out of 24 physi-
cians (46%) gave the correct estimate, a dramatic improve-
ment over the 8% of physicians in the probability format
case.  It does seem that information format can affect doc-
tors’ ability to perform Bayesian inference about issues of
great importance to themselves and their patients.
In general, cognitive algorithms for Bayesian probabilistic
reasoning may be tuned for a natural frequency format rather
than the more common probability format.  Several studies
such as the one presented above seem to support this hy-
pothesis (Gigerenzer, in press).  We further tested it by con-
sidering a difficult puzzle, the notorious three doors prob-
lem, a task not necessarily native to any particular profes-
sion.  In that context, we investigated whether a difference
in information format affected the ability of subjects to per-
form a correct analysis of the likelihoods underlying the
problem.  Could this seemingly subtle change actually make
a significant difference on this popular brainteaser?
The Three Doors Problem
The three doors problem (also called the Monty Hall
problem) (Granberg & Brown, 1995; Selvin, 1975a; Selvin
1975b) has been known as a difficult task since its introduc-
tion as the mathematically equivalent three prisoners prob-
lem (Gardner, 1959a; Gardner 1959b), a task on which peo-
ple typically fail to behave as normative Bayesians.  In fact,
people choose the incorrect answer to the problem so fre-
quently that it has been used as a scenario in which one can
study regret over making a losing decision (Gilovich, Med-
vec & Chen 1995).  It recently enjoyed a resurgence in
popular interest due to a series of columns in Parade Maga-
zine (vos Savant, 1990a, 1990b, 1991a, 1991b) and related
stories in publications including the New York Times (Tier-
ney, 1991).  It can be concisely presented as a multi-part
game involving a player, a host, and three rooms behind
closed doors.  In one room is a valuable prize, a car; in the
other two, something nearly valueless, a penny.  In part 1 of
the game, the player selects a door, which stays closed.  In
part 2, the host opens one of the other two doors to reveal a
penny behind it.  In part 3, the player is offered the chance to
stay with the initially chosen door or switch to the remaining
unopened door, and the player keeps whatever is behind the
door finally selected in part 3.  The problem:  In part 3,
should the player stay or switch?
It has been consistently presumed that people will use the
following two-stage analysis:  When the player makes the
choice in stage one, he has a 33% chance of picking the car;
then, in stage two, after seeing the open door and penny be-
hind it, the two remaining doors each have a 50% chance of
hiding the car. People generally choose to stay with their
initial choice under these circumstances (Granberg &
Brown, 1995) but, no matter how counterintuitive it may
seem, the player should switch.  When two doors remain
unopened, the initially chosen room has a 33% chance of
containing the car, and the other unopened room therefore
has a 67% chance.  One way to understand this is that the
likelihood that the car is behind the initially chosen door is
not affected by opening another door, it remains 33%.  Since
the total probability that the car is behind one of the doors
remains 100%, the probability associated with the other
closed door is 67%.  Other more detailed and varied solu-
tions to this problem are available in many forms, including
a calculation from Bayes' Theorem.  Granberg & Brown
(1995) provide an excellent and informative starting point
for more information on the problem.
Typically, in presentations of the three doors problem, the
facts necessary for the mathematics involved are presented
in a probability format.  People rarely give the correct an-
swer and, one would presume, even more rarely are able to
arrive at a correct Bayesian analysis of the game.  Here, we
explore whether Gigerenzer’s hypothesis that Bayesian rea-
soning algorithms are better adapted for natural frequencies
than probabilities holds for the three doors problem.
Method
We ran a series of three closely related studies to examine
the effect of information format on subjects' ability to cor-
rectly perform the mathematics underlying the three doors
problem.  We focused not only on subjects' answers to the
stay/switch question but also on whether inducing subjects to
reason with natural frequency formats rather than probability
formats improved their normative mathematical perform-
ance on the way toward the final stay/switch answer.  Every
participant in every study was read the same description of
the three doors game (corresponding to and accompanied by
Figure 1), designed to avoid probability or frequency spe-
cific terminology as much as possible1 and present the game
as unambiguously as possible.  We stated explicitly, for in-
stance, that in every run of the game, the host opens a door
to a room containing a penny and then gives the player a
chance to switch, and that the host's choices, within the rules
of the game, are made fairly when applicable.  Omissions of
such details as these can lead to questions extraneous to our
study (see, e.g., (Falk, 1992) and (Granberg & Brown,
1995)).  In general, we made an effort to maximize the
number of subjects who understood the game and its rules
without giving information that was not obvious from the
traditional description.  If subjects failed to understand the
rules and workings of the game, they would certainly be
                                                          
1
 Our presentation agrees with the traditional one in using a single-
game (single-event) description in matters such as likelihoods of
the initial placement of the car. While this may tend to bias
subjects against a natural frequency interpretation  (Gigerenzer &
Hoffrage, 1995), it affects all subjects equally and should not
artificially enhance any advantageous effects a frequency format
might have.

 unable to perform the desired Bayesian analysis accurately
in this experimental context, regardless of whether informa-
tion is presented to them in natural frequency or probability
format.  We were not concerned that our detailed description
of the game might result in a slightly higher rate of correct
answers to the stay/switch question than the traditional pres-
entation, because our focus was on the mathematics and not
simply the stay/switch answers, and our comparisons were
between the two subject groups (i.e., those given frequency
format questions and those given probability format ques-
tions).
After hearing the description of the game, participants an-
swered questions on written questionnaires.  There were
three different questionnaire types, each determining a dif-
ferent study.  For each of the three types, there were fre-
quency and probability versions, designed to induce subjects
to consider the game and related information in terms of
either natural frequencies or probabilities. (Figure 2 shows
the frequency format questionnaire for Experiment 2; its
correct answers are given in the Appendix.  Figure 3 shows
the probability format questionnaire for Experiment 2.)
Every questionnaire had certain common features, such as
an introduction, the stay/switch question, a number of ques-
tions phrased symmetrically (i.e., if a question is asked about
one door, it is asked about all three) with the correct answers
given to at least the first of the questions, and a question
asking subjects if they were previously familiar with the
three doors problem.  For our results, we considered only
subjects for whom the problem was novel.
Jumping to the expected interpretation, that when only
two doors remain closed in the game the chances of the prize
being behind either one are equal, does not require any deep
Bayesian analysis of the sort that a frequency/probability
format variation is likely to influence.  Therefore, we needed
to induce subjects to actually compute the likelihoods after
the host opens a door from the likelihoods beforehand, and
asking a series of computation-based questions leading to
the stay/switch question was our device for eliciting this
analysis.  To promote frequency format analyses, we pro-
vided an introductory section and questions like those shown
in Figure 2.  Similarly, to promote probability format analy-
ses from subjects, the probability versions contained a corre-
sponding introduction and questions like those shown in
Figure 3.  Within each study, questionnaires were matched
so that the questions on the two versions were in minimal
pairs; as much as possible, corresponding questions asked
for the same information (or clearly isomorphic information)
to try to ensure that the questions themselves would not pre-
dispose one group to more correct answers than the other
group.  In general, differences between the frequency and
probability versions were minimized, except for the differ-
ing information formats.  In particular, most of the introduc-
tion and the final stay/switch question were identical on all
questionnaires, across experiments and information format
versions.
On each questionnaire, there were three questions imme-
diately before the stay/switch question that were about the
likelihoods of potential car placement after the host opens a
door to a car-less room; we consider these the "math" ques-
tions for determining whether subjects performed the
mathematical analysis correctly.  These questions were
identical across experiments.  In this paper, we give the per-
centages of subjects who answered the stay/switch question
correctly, regardless of their performance on the math ques-
tions, and of subjects who answered all the math questions
correctly, regardless of their performance on the stay/switch
question.  (Only one person answered all the math questions
correctly and missed the stay/switch question.) In all three
experiments, participation was during class time and no
further incentive to participate was given.
Experiment 1
The first experiment attempted to elicit analysis without too
much coaching, using 8 questions on each questionnaire and
giving the correct answer to only the first question.  This is
the presentation we intended to use as our closest analogy to
the three doors problem in its traditional form (unaccompa-
nied by outside questions).
Subjects
112 Cornell University students from introductory courses in
psychology, cognitive science, German, and computer sci-
ence were participants. 58 subjects had frequency format
questionnaires; 54 subjects had probability format question-
naires.
Results
21% of the subjects in the frequency version gave the correct
stay/switch answer, while 18% gave the correct answer in
the probability version; t(110) = .29, p>.1.  On the math
questions, 7% of the subjects in the frequency version gave
correct responses, while 0% of the subjects in the probability
version gave those correct answers; t(110) = 1.98, p < .05.
Discussion
This questionnaire was constructed for minimal coaching to
the correct stay/switch answer and without much help lead-
ing to the correct math, lacking three questions present in
Experiments 2 and 3.  The results show no significant effect
of the variation of information format on people’ s perform-
ance on the stay/switch question.  However, they show a
small but significant effect suggesting that the frequency
format facilitates Bayesian performance on the mathematics
leading to the stay/switch response.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, the questionnaires had 11 questions, which
explicitly asked for all the components needed for a solution
according to Bayes' Theorem, trying to elicit information
from subjects without explicitly giving any added facts.  The
added three questions would, we presume, encourage deeper
3-Doors Problem Questionnaire
Imagine that you’ve seen 30,000 rounds of the game played in which the player chooses door A in part 1 of the
round.  We will be asking you questions only about those rounds.  We are not trying to trick you with any of the
questions, just making sure you understand the game.  We will even give you the first answer to get you started.
1) Of these 30,000 rounds in which the player chooses door A in part 1 of the round, in how many is the car
actually behind door A?  _10,000__
2) Of these 30,000 rounds in which the player chooses door A in part 1 of the round, in how many is the car
actually behind door B?  _________
3) Of these 30,000 rounds in which the player chooses door A in part 1 of the round, in how many is the car
actually behind door C?  _________
The next three questions all ask about the host opening door B in part 2 of a round.
4) Of the rounds in the answer to question 1), the rounds in which the player chooses A in part 1 and the car is
actually behind door A, in how many of those rounds will the host open door B in part 2 of the round?
_________
5) Of the rounds in the answer to question 2), the rounds in which the player chooses A in part 1 and the car is
actually behind door B, in how many of those rounds will the host open door B in part 2 of the round?
_________
6) Of the rounds in the answer to question 3), the rounds in which the player chooses A in part 1 and the car is
actually behind door C, in how many of those rounds will the host open door B in part 2 of the round?
_________
Keeping in mind your answers to 4), 5), and 6) above...
7) In how many of these 30,000 rounds of the game in which the player picks door A in part 1 of the round does
the host open door B in part 2 of the round?  _________
Keeping in mind your previous answers....
8) In how many of those rounds from question 7), the ones in which the player picks A in part 1 of the round and
the host picks B in part 2 of the round, is the car actually behind door A?  ________
9) In how many of those rounds from question 7), the ones in which the player picks A in part 1 of the round and
the host picks B in part 2 of the round, is the car actually behind door B?  ________
10) In how many of those rounds from question 7), the ones in which the player picks A in part 1 of the round
and the host picks B in part 2 of the round, is the car actually behind door C?  ______
Last:  Based on your knowledge, in a round of the game in which the player chooses door A in part 1 of the
round and the host opens door B in part 2 of the round, what should the player do in part 3 of the round?  Should
the player STAY with door A or SWITCH to door C?  _________
FOR OUR INFORMATION:  Had you heard of this game before today?  _________
Figure 2.  Questionnaire for Experiment 2, Frequency format.
3-Doors Problem Questionnaire
We will be asking you questions only about rounds in which the player chooses door A in part 1 of a round of the
game.  We are not trying to trick you with any of the questions, just making sure you understand the game.  We
will even give you the first answer to get you started.
1) In a round in which the player chooses door A in part 1, what is the probability that the car is actually behind
door A?  _1/3_ (or _33.3%_, whichever you prefer)
2) In a round in which the player chooses door A in part 1, what is the probability that the car is actually behind
door B?  _________
3) In a round in which the player chooses door A in part 1, what is the probability that the car is actually behind
door C?  _________
The next three questions all ask about the host opening door B in part 2 of a round.
4) In a round as in question 1), in which the player chooses door A in part 1 and the car is actually behind door A,
what is the probability that the host will open door B in part 2 of the round?  _________
5) In a round as in question 2), in which the player chooses door A in part 1 and the car is actually behind door B,
what is the probability that the host will open door B in part 2 of the round?  _________
6) In a round as in question 3), in which the player chooses door A in part 1 and the car is actually behind door C,
what is the probability that the host will open door B in part 2 of the round?  _________
Keeping in mind your answers to 4), 5), and 6) above...
7) In a round of the game in which the player picks door A in part 1 of the round, what is the probability that the
host will open door B in part 2 of the round?  _________
Keeping in mind your previous answers....
8) In a round as in question 7), a round in which the player picks A in part 1 of the round and the host picks B in
part 2 of the round, what is the probability that the car is actually behind door A?  ________
9) In a round as in question 7), a round in which the player picks A in part 1 of the round and the host picks B in
part 2 of the round, what is the probability that the car is actually behind door B?  ________
10) In a round as in question 7), a round in which the player picks A in part 1 of the round and the host picks B in
part 2 of the round, what is the probability that the car is actually behind door C?  ______
Last:  Based on your knowledge, in a round of the game in which the player chooses door A in part 1 of the
round and the host opens door B in part 2 of the round, what should the player do in part 3 of the round?  Should
the player STAY with door A or SWITCH to door C?  _________
FOR OUR INFORMATION:  Had you heard of this game before today?  _________
Figure 3.  Questionnaire for Experiment 2, Probability format.
analysis than the Experiment 1 questionnaire.  As in Ex-
periment 1, we gave the correct answer to only the first
question.
Subjects
68 Cornell students from introductory courses in psychol-
ogy, cognitive science, and German were participants.  34
had frequency format questionnaires, and 34 had probability
format questionnaires.
Results
29% of the subjects in the frequency version gave the correct
stay/switch answer, while 12% gave the correct answer in
the probability version; t(66) = 1.82, p<.1.  Considering only
the math questions, 21% of the subjects in the frequency
version gave correct responses, while 0% of the subjects in
the probability version responded correctly; t(66)=2.93,
p<.01.
Discussion
We saw a marginally significant effect of information for-
mat on people’ s performance when considering only the
stay/switch question.  However, we saw a robust effect on
performance on the math questions, supporting the notion
that frequency format facilitates Bayesian inference when
figuring out the game's underlying mathematics.
Experiment 3
For Experiment 3, we used the same 11 questions as in Ex-
periment 2, but we gave the correct answers to the first 6 —
nearly all but the math and stay/switch questions.  Our goal
was to inhibit any floor effect or paralysis over math dis-
comfort by giving subjects a head start and providing evi-
dence, upon their self-checking, that they either successfully
understood the game or did not understand it and needed to
analyze it further.
Subjects
75 Cornell students from introductory courses in psychol-
ogy, cognitive science, and German were participants.  38
had frequency format questionnaires, and 37 had probability
format questionnaires.
Results
37% of the subjects in the frequency version gave the correct
stay/switch answer, while 27% gave the correct answer in
the probability version; t(73) = .9, p>.1.  On the math ques-
tions, 26% of the subjects in the frequency version gave cor-
rect responses, while 0% of the subjects in the probability
version responded correctly; t(73)=3.59, p<.001.
Discussion
We found a similar effect to that in Experiment 2.  There
was some concern unique to Experiment 3, however, that
some subjects might have merely copied the answers from
questions 4-6 into the answer slots for questions 8-10, which
would coincidentally have been the correct math answers in
the frequency version.  Possibly-copied answers appeared
with negligible frequency in the probability version, how-
ever, and the overall effect in Experiment 3 was not very
different than in Experiment 2, so we consider this possible
copying to be a highly unlikely influence on our results.
General Discussion
The results compellingly demonstrate that information pre-
sented and manipulated in a frequency format facilitated
Bayesian competence in understanding the mathematics un-
derlying the three doors problem.  Given a presentation of
the problem in frequency format, rates of correctness on the
math questions ranged from 7% to 26%, depending on the
experiment.  Given a presentation in probability format, cor-
rectness on the math questions was a flat 0% in all experi-
ments.  This supports Gigerenzer's hypothesis about the im-
portance of information format to normative Bayesian per-
formance on inference tasks.
Note that the 0% correctness rate on the math questions in
the probability versions does not conflict with past results,
although it does reflect our using a different measure of per-
formance.  Previous studies such as that of Granberg &
Brown asked merely for a stay/switch answer, not for evi-
dence of whether responders understood the underlying
mathematics or evidence about which information format
responders might be considering when computing the rele-
vant likelihoods, so our central result is based upon a differ-
ent question.  A comparison of like measures yields com-
patible results:  We found that between 12% and 27% of our
subjects answered the stay/switch question correctly, de-
pending on the experiment; in their initial study, Granberg &
Brown (1995) found 13% of their subjects answered the
stay/switch question correctly.  The disagreement between
the high end of our numbers and the percentage reported by
Granberg & Brown (1995) may have several explanations,
from the presence of a computationally-oriented question-
naire in our study to different subject populations and myr-
iad other factors.  This discrepancy, however, is unrelated to
the crux of our experiment, the value of one information
format over another.  Are the algorithms that people use for
mathematical reasoning better tuned for natural frequencies
than probabilities?  On this particular brainteaser, it seems
that the change in information format can indeed open doors
for people.
Finally, in addition to suggesting that Gigerenzer's hy-
pothesis applies to two-stage decision processes such as the
three doors problem as well as simpler contexts already ex-
plored (Gigerenzer, in press), we hope our results can add a
new aspect to the current three doors problem literature.
There are many printed and World Wide Web based expla-
nations of the correct stay/switch answer to the game, but we
suggest that an explanation in frequency format — which
seems to be a highly non-standard approach, given a quick
scan of the current literature — might help some of the
many people who are initially skeptical of the Bayesian an-
swer to understand and accept that answer.  This use of the
explanatory power of frequency format presentations would
be consistent with the claim (Gigerenzer, in press) that fre-
quency format explanations render more persuasive and un-
derstandable arguments about likelihoods relevant to the O.J.
Simpson trial, HIV testing, and other topics of widespread
popular interest.
Appendix:  Answers to
Frequency Format Questionnaire
The correct answers to the frequency format questionnaire in
Figure 2 are:
1) 10,000
2) 10,000
3) 10,000 (because the car is placed randomly)
4) 5,000 (because the host chooses fairly when he can)
5) 0
6) 10,000
7) 15,000
8) 5,000
9) 0
10) 10,000
And, of course: SWITCH.
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